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n banci review
was originally intended to resolve conflicts in circuit
precedent. 2 In this process, every active judge on a court can consider
the merits of the disparate approaches taken by two individual threejudge panels, thus resolving the conflict. Full-scale in banc proceedings,
however, which require full briefing, oral argument, and multiple opinions, are cumbersome, costly and time-consuming. 3 In determining
whether to proceed with in banc review, courts appear to weigh the costs
of in banc review against its potential benefits.4 Employing this calculus,
courts often forgo in banc review in conflict cases that would otherwise
receive such treatment. 5
One solution to this problem is to reduce the cost and delay of in banc
proceedings by streamlining the procedure. Recently, several federal
circuit courts of appeals have adopted abbreviated forms of in banc
review. 6 These "mini" in banc proceedings share certain central characteristics. They are initiated by the three-judge panel assigned to hear the
case in the first instance and are conducted without oral argument. They
do not result in separate opinions from the majority and dissenters.
The purposes of this Article are to survey, describe and assess the
usefulness of mini in banc procedures. Part I presents a brief history of in
banc procedures, concluding that the original purpose of these procedures
was to resolve conflicts in precedent. Part II explores how often in banc
procedures are employed, concluding that there are many conflict cases
that could easily be treated in banc that do not currently receive such
treatment. Part III considers the disadvantages of traditional in banc
procedures, and Part IV describes the mini in banc procedures adopted by
some circuits. Part V surveys the potential objections to these new
procedures and concludes that mini in banc review is a legitimate tool for
resolving conflicts in precedent.

1 This paper adopts the usage of the federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 46(c)(1982), and the

federal rule, FED. R. App. P. 35, in referring to "in banc" rather than "en banc" proceedings.
2 See infra Part I.
See infra Part III.
4 See, e.g., Edwards Co. v. Monogram Indus., Inc., 730 F.2d 977, 987 (5th Cir.

1984)(Rubin, J., concurring)("the resources of our fourteen-judge en banc court should be
reserved for cases worthy of that effort"); Church of Scientology v. Foley, 640 F.2d 1335,
1341 (D.C. Cir. 1980)(in banc)(Robinson, J., dissenting) ("[b]ecause it engages every active
judge, consideration of a case en banc drains judicial resources .... ), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
961 (1981); Speigner v. Jago, 603 F.2d 1208, 1212 n.4 (6th Cir. 1979)("it would be a waste
ofjudicial time and resources to automatically require en banc hearing each and every time
this court overrules or modifies one of its previous decisions."), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1076
(1980).
5 See infra Part II.
6 See infra Part IV (describing various circuit practices).
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I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Throughout the bulk of history of the federal courts, circuit courts
consisted of three members; separate in banc procedures were unknown.
Circuit courts were created by the Judiciary Act of 1789. 7 This legislation-in which Congress for the first time exercised the power granted it
under Article III of the Constitution to establish lower federal courtsprovided for thirteen district and three circuit courts. The circuit courts
had both original and appellate jurisdiction. There were, however, no
circuit judges as such. Panels of the circuit courts consisted of two
Supreme Court Justices "riding circuit" and the Judge of the district in
which the session was convened. In 1793, Congress reduced the regular
panel to one Supreme Court Justice and one district Judge.8 Nearly
eighty years later, Congress finally established circuit judgeships, with
one judge assigned to each circuit. 9
Congress provided for federal question jurisdiction for the first time in
1875.10 That development, coupled with the rapid population increase
and industrialization of the post-war era, produced a flood of cases in the
federal courts. The federal courts, fundamentally unchanged since the
Judiciary Act of 1789, were ill-equipped to handle the burden." The
Evarts Act of 189112 finally provided relief by interposing circuit courts
of appeals between the Supreme Court and the trial courts. Consonant
with previous legislation, the Evarts Act provided that the circuit courts
of appeals "shall consist of three judges."'13 The Evarts Act did not abolish
the old circuit courts, however; it merely terminated their appellate
14
jurisdiction.
Finally, in the Judicial Code of 1911, Congress eliminated the old
circuit courts and transferred their remaining original jurisdiction to the
district courts. 15 Thus, the structure of the modern federal courts was
completed.
Although the 1911 Act carried over the three-judge provision of the
Evarts Act, 16 it also provided for more than three circuit judgeships in the

7 Judiciary Act, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). For a detailed account of the evolution of the
federal courts, see C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 3503-3504 (1975).
8 Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73.
9 Act of April 10, 1869, ch. 22, § 2, 16 Stat. 44.
10 Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470.
1 See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 56-59 (1928); H.
HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 44-45
12 Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, §§ 2, 4, 26 Stat. 826.
13
14
"
16

(1953).

Id. § 2.
Id. § 4.
Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1087.
Id. § 117, 36 Stat. 1131.
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Second, Seventh and Eighth Circuits.'7 Thus, a controversy was born
over whether the courts of appeals could sit with more than three judges.
Many observers questioned the legality of multi-judge courts deciding
cases in light of the historical three-judge panel model. 18 Congress only
intensified this controversy by adding circuit judgeships. By 1938, all but
two of the eleven circuits had more than three judges. 19
By the late 1930s, the question of the legality of courts sitting with
more than three judges finally received judicial review. In 1938, the
Ninth Circuit held that no more than three judges may sit in the Circuit
Court of Appeals. 20 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the provision in the
Evarts Act, carried over into the 1911 Act, providing that a circuit court
of appeals "shall consist of three judges," governed the size of the panel of
21
the court irrespective of the number of judges appointed to the court.
The Ninth Circuit found that any other rule could lead to the embarassment of judges demanding to participate in the hearing of every appeal.
Moreover, the court noted, such a rule could dramatically increase the
22
workload of each judge.
Two years later, the Third Circuit ruled that in banc sittings were
permitted in exceptional cases involving a difference in views among
judges on a-question of fundamental importance.2 3 The Third Circuit
reasoned that the Act of Congress authorizing more than three judges for
the Third Circuit amended the previous provision for three-judge circuit
24

courts.

In Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner,25 the Supreme Court
agreed with the Third Circuit view. The Court suggested that the central
purpose of in banc reviews was to resolve conflicts in precedent:
Certainly, the result reached makes for more effective judicial
administration. Conflicts within a circuit will be avoided. Finality of decisions in the circuit courts of appeal will be promoted.

17 Id.

§ 118.

This debate is most apparent in congressional pronouncements on the meaning of the
provisions for more than three judges in some circuits. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 102, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1924)(suggesting that no more than three judges can sit on a circuit
court); 46 CONG. REC. 84 (1910)(statement of Rep. Moon)("We have made no change
whatever [in the operation of the courts].").
19 See Comment, In Banc Procedures in the United States Courts of Appeals, 43 FORD. L.
REV. 401, 402 (1974)[hereinafter Fordham Note]; Note, The Power of a Circuit Court to Sit
En Banc, 55 HARV. L. REV. 663, 665-66 (1942).
18

Lang's Estate v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d 867, 869 (9th Cir. 1938).
Id. at 870 n.2.
22 Id.
23 Commissioner v. Textile Mills Sec. Corp., 117 F.2d 62,71 (3d Cir. 1940)(in banc), affd,

2'

21

314 U.S. 326 (1941).
24
25

Id. at 70.

Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326 (1941).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol34/iss4/5

4

1986]

"MINI" IN BANC PROCEEDINGS

Those considerations are especially important in view of the fact
that in our federal judicial system these26courts are the courts of
last resort in the run of ordinary cases.
In 1948, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 46(c), which codified the power
of the courts of appeals to sit in banc. 27 This provision allowed in banc
proceedings, but did not compel them. In enacting Section 46(c), Congress
accepted the view that28 the main value of in banc review was to resolve
conflicts in precedent.
In 1953, The Supreme Court decided Western P. R.R. Corp. v. Western
P. R.R.,29 which established that a litigant retained the right to suggest
to an appellate court the appropriateness of in banc hearing or rehearing.
In addition, the Court required that each circuit clearly explain, for the
benefit of potential litigants, its in banc rules. 30 In reaching its decision,
the Court again referred to the conflict scenario as most appropriate for
in banc review. 3 1 Justice Frankfurter, concurring in the judgment, made
the point even more clearly: "Rehearings en banc by these courts, which
to resolve conflicts
sit in panels, are to some extent necessary in order
32
between panels. This is the dominant concern."
In 1968, Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Rule 35 expressed the congressional view that in banc proceedings should
be used sparingly 33 Rule 35 also reiterated the point that resolution of
conflicts is the central reason for in banc review. According to the new

26 Id. at 334-35.
27 Section 46(c) currently provides:

Cases and controversies shall be heard and determined by a court or panel of not
more than three judges (except that the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit may sit in panels of more than three judges if its rules so provide),
unless a hearing or rehearing before the court in banc is ordered by a majority of
the circuit judges of the circuit who are in regular active service. A court in banc
shall consist of all circuit judges in regular active service, or such number of
judges as may be prescribed..., except that any senior circuit judge of the circuit
shall be eligible to participate, at his election and upon designation and
assignment... as a member of an in banc court reviewing a decision of a panel of
which such judge was a member.
28 U.S.C. § 46(c)(1982).
2 The House Report on the new provision states this view: "If the court can sit in banc,
the situation where two three-judge courts may reach conflicting conclusions is obviated. It
also will obviate the situation where ...

a decision of two judges ... sets the precedent for

the remaining judges." H.R. REP. No. 1246, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1941); see also Hearings
before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciaryon S. 1053, 77th Cong., 1st
Sess. 39-40 (1941). The one-page House Report makes no mention of important cases as a
focus for the new provision.
2 Western P. R.R. Corp. v. Western P. R.R., 345 U.S. 247, 261 (1953).
30 id.
3, Id. at 260 n.20.
32 Id. at 270 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
3 FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)("Such a hearing or rehearing is not favored ...
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rule, however, in banc review may also be used to resolve exceptionally
important cases.3 4 This latter concern has evolved into the dominant
present-day use of in banc review.

II.

THE

UNUSED POTENTIAL OF IN BA'c REVIEW

The legislative history of the in banc rules and the thrust of the
relevant Supreme Court cases indicate that the in banc procedure was
originally designed to minimize conflicts in precedent. That conflict
resolution was once the dominant concern of in banc review is not
surprising. The structure and function of federal appellate courts mandate an in banc review process. A three-judge panel cannot effectively
resolve conflicts in precedent. Every three-judge panel of a circuit court of
appeals is the court for the purposes of circuit precedent. 35 Without a
limiting rule, therefore, one three-judge panel could freely overturn the
decision of another panel. Courts are concerned, however, with protecting
stare decisis. Stare decisis promotes certainty in the law, to the benefit of
litigants, interested parties, and the courts alike.3 6 To promote stare
decisis, the majority of courts have held that one panel of a court cannot
overrule a prior panel's rulings. 37 Even if a court does not feel obliged to
follow that rule, in banc treatment is still desirable. A statement from the
entire body of judges on a court is obviously more authoritative than the

" See id. (listing purposes).

35 See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c)(1982)("Case and controversies shall be heard and determined by

a court or panel of not more than three judges ....").
a" The central role of stare decisis in our jurisprudence is amply documented. See, e.g.,
Vasquez v. Hillery, 106 S.Ct. 617, 624-25 (1986)("[T]he important doctrine of stare decisis
[is] the means by which we ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but will
develop in a principled and intelligible fashion."); Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119
(1940)("We recognize that stare decisis embodies an important social policy. It represents an
element of continuity in law, and is rooted in the psychologic need to satisfy reasonable
expectations."); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932)(Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)("Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more
important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right."). But see
Wise, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 21 WAYNE L. REV. 1043, 1056 (1975)(suggesting that
stare decisis does not acutally enhance certainty in the law).
" See, e.g., Association of Civilian Technicians, Mo. Air Chapter v. FLRA, 756 F.2d 172,
176 (D.C. Cir. 1985); White v. Estelle, 720 F.2d 415, 417 (5th Cir. 1983); Women's Services,
P.C. v. Thone, 690 F.2d 667, 668 (8th Cir. 1982), vacated on othergrounds sub nor. Kerrey
v. Women's Services P.C., 462 U.S. 1126 (1983); In re Jaylaw Drug, Inc., 621 F.2d 524, 527
(2d Cir. 1980)(indicating that one panel may not depart from holding of previous panel);
United States ex rel Scoleri v. Banmiller, 310 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S.
828 (1963); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 273 n.3 (9th Cir. 1961); But see Speigner v. Jago,
603 F.2d 1208, 1212 n.4 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1076 (1980); North Carolina
Utilities Comm'n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036, 1044-45 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874
(1977).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol34/iss4/5
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38
views of a single three-judge panel. The circuit courts, moreover, cannot
will
rely on the Supreme Court to resolve these conflicts. The Court
39
rarely, if ever, grant certiorari in an intra-circuit conflict case.
Despite the agreement from courts, Congress and commentators that in
banc review is a useful method for resolving conflicts in precedent, it is
apparent that not all such conflicts are resolved by in banc proceedings.
Rather, in banc review has come to be the dominant vehicle for deciding
cases presenting novel and important issues. Conflict resolution is now a
secondary concern of in banc review.
The most direct evidence on the underutilization of the in banc
procedure comes from a study of the in banc decisions of one of the courts
of appeals, the D.C. Circuit. The survey examined 76 in banc cases
decided by the D.C. Circuit between 1971 and 1985. After a review of
several indicators, 40 the cases were categorized according to the court's
reason for granting in banc review. The survey revealed that very few
(eight of seventy-six or 10.5%) in banc cases involved conflicts in prior
precedent. Rather, the vast majority of cases were heard in banc because
of the importance of the questions presented. Table I indicates the type of
cases that were heard in banc by the D.C. Circuit.

Table I
D.C. CIRCUIT IN BANC
CASES 1971-1985
CASE TYPE
Important/Trend-Setting
Constitutional
Administrative
Watergate
Other
Conflict Resolution
Total

NUMBER
68
29
15
8
16
8
76

3' See United States v. American-Foreign Steamship Corp., 363 U.S. 685, 689
(1960)(suggesting that in banc procedures are appropriate whenever the case required
"authoritative consideration and decision by those charged with the administration and
development of the law of the circuit").
'9 See Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 340 (1974); CAB v, American Air Transp.,
344 U.S. 4 (1952); United States ex. rel. Robinson v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 649 (1942); Note, En

Banc Hearingsin the FederalCourtsofAppeals: Accomodating InstitutionalResponsibilities
(Part1), 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 563, 582 (1965)[hereinafter NYU Note].
40 These indicators included the following: 1) An explicit statement by the court. Such

statements occurred at the outset of the majority, concurring, or dissenting opinions and
were often accompanied by reference to FED. R. App. P. 35; 2) Citations to prior D.C. Circuit
caselaw. Where the in banc opinion cited no prior D.C. Circuit law, we presumed that the
case involved a novel issue rather than a conflict; 3) The subject of the opinion. For example,
opinions which concentrated on interpretations of recent Supreme Court precedent were
considered not to involve conflicts.
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Table II
SURVEY OF D.C. CIRCUIT CONFLICTS
CASES 1971-1980
Year
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
Total

Conflicts Within
Circuit
0
1
1
0
2
1
0
1
1
0
6

Conflicts Outside
Circuit
0
0
3
3
0
1
1
0
0
0
8

Further evidence on the underutilization of the in banc procedure for
conflict resolution appears in another survey of D.C. Circuit cases. This
study documents conflicts generated in the D.C. Circuit's precedent
during the ten-year period spanning 1971-1980. For convenience, the
survey examined results from Shepard's Citations. It surveyed 200
randomly-selected cases, 20 from each year, and counted potential
conflicts both within and outside the circuit. 41 The results of this survey
are presented in Table II.

"' The volumes of SHEPARD'S CITATIONS indicate when a case has been overruled,
questioned, criticized, or limited by a subsequent case. Each of these indicators denotes a
potential conflict in precedent. We randomly selected 20 cases from each of these years (a
total of 200 cases), and Shepardized each of the citations, looking for subsequent cases
overruling, questioning, criticizing, or limiting these cases. We found no subsequent cases
overruling cases examined in the survey.
We included as a potential conflict case any case that had been overruled, questioned,
criticized, or limited by any case within or outside the circuit. This method of counting could
overstate the number of conflict cases. Since the focus of this Article is on the resolution of
intra-circuit conflict cases, we could count only those cases that revealed subsequent
conflicts within the circuit. Conflicts in precedent within a circuit are perhaps more
intolerable than those between circuits. In certain circumstances, inter-circuit conflicts are
useful as experiments. Armed wtih the results from two or more different approaches, a
court considering a rule for the first time, or the Supreme Court, may choose its rule more
carefully. Estreicher & Sexton, A ManagerialTheory of the Supreme Court'sResponsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 716-20 (1984)(describing this as a
"percolation" process); Wallace, The Nature and Extent of IntercircuitConflicts: A Solution
Needed for a Mountain or a Molehill?, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 913, 929 (1983)(describing
advantages of conflicts); Stevens, Some Thoughts on Judicial Restraint,66 JUDICATURE 177,
183 (1982)("[Tlhe existence of differing rules of law in different sections of our great country
is not always an intolerable evil... "). The danger that parties will not be able to arrange
their affairs is minimized by the fact that they can determine which jurisdiction's rule will
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These figures provide a conservative estimate of the total number of
conflicts generated from cases decided in these years. 42 Assuming that
these results accurately represent the years from which they were drawn,
it is estimated that during the ten-year period between 1971 and 1980,
the D.C. Circuit decided between 90 and 210 cases that would later lead
to conflicts in precedent. 43 Certainly not all of these cases represent
insoluble conflicts worthy of in banc treatment. This survey of D.C.
number of
Circuit cases, however, suggests that there are a significant
44
conflict cases that do not currently receive in banc review.
Somewhat less direct evidence supports the conclusion that the use of
in banc review to resolve conflicts has diminished. The thrust of that

apply to them. Intra-circuit conflicts, by contrast, serve only to confuse parties as to their
rights and responsibilities and to detract from the authority of the court.
Despite these observations, inter-circuit conflicts also present hazards tojuducial administration. These hazards include delay in the final resolution of questions, uncertainty about
the law, forum shopping, and expanded litigation. Thompson, Increasing Uniformity and
Capacityin the FederalAppellate System, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 457,470 (1984); Wallace,
supra this note, at 930. In banc review is often appropriate to remove a circuit precedent
that has been subsequently contradicted by other circuits. See Hellman, The Propsoed
IntercircuitTribunal: Do We Need It: Will It Work? 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 375, 400 n.112
(1984); NYU Note, supra note 39, at 594.
42 The figures do not include conflicts that may be generated in the future. This factor
might be particularly significant for cases decided in the latter survey years. The figures
also do not include unpublished orders which may conflict with prior precedent. In one
recent year, for example, the court decided 278 cases with full opinion and 770 without.
Edwards, Public Misperceptions Concerning the "Politics"of Judging: Dispelling Some
Myths About the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. COLO. L. REv. 619, 642 (1985)(Table II).
" During that ten-year period, the D.C. Circuit published 3013 opinions. If we assume
that conflicts occur at the rate of 6 in 200 (conflicts within the circuit only) or 3% then those
3013 opinions would have generated 90 potential conflicts. If we assume that the rate is 14
in 200 (including conflicts outside the circuit) or 7%, then there would be 210 potential
conflicts.
4" The results for the D.C. Circuit may be even less dramatic than they would be in other
circuits. The D.C. Circuit does not have the largest number of judges nor the largest
caseload of the circuits. Both these facts may mean that other circuits, such as the 5th or 9th
have an even greater number of potential conflict cases. See, e.g., Carrington, Crowded
Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and the National
Law, 82 HARv. L. REV. 542, 584 (1969)("as the size of the court is increased, the likelihood
of differences among the judges is increased, and a wider variety of idiosyncracies is likely
to appear in their decisions"); Fordham Note, supra note 19, at 401 (indicating that increase
in caseload and increase in number of judgeships "decrease the control exercised by the
majority of active judges over panel decisions"); NYU Note, supra note 39, at 564 ("the
number of en banc hearings and rehearings has risen steadily with the growing awareness
of their availability and with the growing number of cases and judge in the courts of
appeals"); Note, Playing with Numbers: Determining the Majority of Judges Required to
GrantEn Bane Sittings in the United States Courts of Appeals, 70 VA. L. REv. 1505, 1508-09
(1984) [hereinafter Virginia Note](noting a "likelihood that large courts and growing
caseloads will prevent circuit judges from remaining fully abreast of panel decisions in
which they do not participate").
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evidence is that the use of the in banc procedure has not grown in
proportion to the number of cases decided by the courts of appeals. During
the fiscal year ending June 30, 1965, for example, the courts of appeals
decided 51 cases in banc out of a total of 5,771 cases decided. 46 By the
fiscal year ending June 30, 1985, the number of cases terminated by the
courts of appeals had grown to 16,369, but the courts decided only 85
cases in banc. 46 Thus, the number of in banc cases grew by 66.6 percent
while the number of cases terminated grew by 183 percent. If in banc
procedures were used primarily to resolve conflicts, presumably, the
number of in banc cases would grow in proportion to the total number of
cases decided.
This statistical evidence on the underutilization of the in banc procedure for conflict resolution is supported by the views of many legal
observers. Both judges and commentators have noted that the in banc
procedure is used only infrequently to resolve conflicts. For example,
former Chief Judge Robinson, of the District of Columbia Circuit,
dissenting in Church of Scientology v. Foley,47 proposed the general rule
that "the truly extraordinary 'cases meriting en banc treatment are those
involving issue[s] likely to affect many other cases'-in other words,
those of real significance to the legal process as well as to the litigants. ''4
Chief Judge Robinson's statement suggests that the existence of a conflict
is, alone, insufficient to justify in banc treatment. More recently, Judge
Wald, recently appointed Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit court, reemphasized this general approach, suggesting that the court will review a case
49
in banc only when the force of prior precedent becomes intolerable.
These statements are echoed by the observations of several commentators. 50

Although in banc review was originally designed to resolve conflicts in
precedent, the evidence indicates that courts currently underutilize this
method of procedure. The overriding reason that courts avoid in banc
review is that hearings in banc are expensive, time-consuming and

" NYU Note, supra note 39, at 564.

46 See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Annual Report 121
(1985)[hereinafter Annual Report] (Table seven) (appeals terminated on the merits)(table
includes both decisions after oral hearing and decisions after submission on briefs).
" Church of Scientlogy v. Foley, 640 F.2d 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1980)(in banc), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 961 (1981).
4 Id. at 1341 (Robinson, J., dissenting)(brackets in original)(footnotes omitted).
49 P. Wald, Lecture at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law 8 (April, 1986)(See article by
Chief Judge Wald at page 476 of this issue).
" See, e.g., Fordham Note, supra note 19, at 409-10 (suggesting that, in Second Circuit,
in bane treatment is granted only when both unformity and importance criteria are met);
Note, En Banc Review in Federal Circuit Courts; A Reassessment, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1637,
1647 (1974)[hereinafter Michigan Note] (reporting on survey of circuit court judges which
found that many listed resolution of intra-circuit conflicts as a secondary concern of in banc
review).
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inefficient. Part III, surveys these drawbacks to conventional in banc
procedure.
III.

DISADVANTAGES OF CONVENTIONAL IN BANc REVIEW

Courts and commentators agree that conventional in banc review must
be used sparingly, largely because of its potential problems15 These
problems are several. In banc review does not always accomplish its
purposes; it can be inefficient. Such review also taxes the resources of the
courts. For these reasons, courts hesitate to make use of the conventional
procedure.
The structure of conventional in banc review virtually guarantees that
the procedure will, for the most part, fail to resolve conflicts in precedent.
The primary reason for this failure is that in banc cases rarely produce
consensus. In the period from 1971 to 1985, for example, the D.C. Circuit
52
issued 87 in banc opinions, 66.09 percent of which contained a dissent.
That dissent rate compares to an overall dissent rate in the D.C. Circuit
in a recent year of 5.8 percent. 53 These figures are confirmed by an earlier
54
survey of all the circuits.
The multiple opinions often produced by in banc proceedings undermine the purpose of in banc review. Multiple opinions are less likely to
produce a clear statement of the law. Subsequent litigants and judges
may, as a consequence, suffer the same uncertainties about the state of
the law as they suffered before the in banc decision.55 Multiple opinions
also detract from the sense of finality which in banc review is intended to
achieve. Losing parties and other interested persons may be tempted to
56
re-test an issue, especially once the composition of the court changes.

51

See, e.g., Church of Scientology v. Foley, 640 F.2d 1335, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1980)(en

banc)(Robinson, J., dissenting) (suggesting that in banc review is appropriate only in rare
circumstances), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981); Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d
1033, 1041 (2d Cir. 1972), affd, 414 U.S. 291 (1973)(same); Michigan Note, supra note 50,

at 1645 (suggesting presumption against in banc review); NYU Note, supra note 39, at 577
("en banc proceedings must be strongly disfavored, and justification for them must approach
the level of necessity"); Virginia Note, supra note 44, at 1509.
2 If we count only the in banc cases that produced any opinion, the figure is even higher.
Of the 62 cases, 26 were decided without opinion. For the remaining 36 cases with 29
dissents, the dissent rate is 80.5%.
" Edwards, Public Misperceptions Concerning the "Politics" of Judging: Dispelling

Some Myths About the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. COLO. L. REv. 619, 642 (1985)(Table I)(figures
collected from 1983-84 term).
5" In a review of all in banc cases from 1940 through June 1964, 262, or 61.9% of the
cases resulted in at least one dissent. See NYU Note, supra note 39, at 608 (Table IV).
" Newman, Foreward,In Banc Practicein the Second Circuit:The Virtues of Restraint,

50 BROOKLYN L. REV. 365, 382 (1984); Fordham Note, supra note 19, at 422; Michigan Note,
supra note 50, at 1646; NYU Note, supra note 39, at 583.
56 See NYU Note, supra note 39, at 583 (noting that "[flailure to agree en banc may
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In banc review fails to resolve conflicts because it sometimes produces
no decision at all.5 7 When an in banc court is evenly divided, the lower
court or agency decision remains in effect with no clear statement from
the appellate court.5 8 When the issue has been left undecided by an
evenly divided court, the temptation to renew the battle in the next case
59
or with the next change in the court is all the greater.
Finally, conventional in banc review often does not resolve conflicts
because of the vote-counting rules that apply in such cases. Ordinarily, if
a judge who is assigned to a three-judge panel discovers that he must
recuse himself, he will be replaced and the appeal proceeds to decision as
usual. The statutory provision for in bane review, however, provides that
"[a] court in banc shall consist of all circuit judges in regular active
service .... 60 A majority of the circuits that have considered the issue
have interpreted this provision to require an absolute majority vote of the
circuit judges in order to convene an in bane hearing. For these purposes,
recusals are counted as "no" votes. 6' As a result, with the conventional in
banc procedure, it may be impossible to convene the court6 2in bane even
though a majority of the unrecused judges favor doing so.

leave judges unwilling to respect the en banc precedent strictly in subsequent panel
decisions").
5 See id., at 584 (14 of 84 cases in sample were deadlocked).
8 When a case is set for rehearing in bane, the panel opinion is vacated. See Church of
Scientology v. Foley, 640 F.2d 1335, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1980)(in banc)(Robinson, J., dissenting)
(stating prevailing circuit practice), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981); D. KNt13, FEDERAL
COURT OF APPEALs MANUAL 286 (1981) (noting that rule that panel opinion and judgment is
vacated upon granting of rehearing in banc is applicable in all courts). When an in bane
court is evenly divided, therefore, the original lower court decision is reinstated. See
Ginsburg, Feldman & Bress v. Federal Energy Admin., 591 F.2d 752 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 906 (1979); Bankers Life Co. v. United States, 587 F.2d 893 (8th Cir. 1978);
Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 548 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. Holmes,
537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976); Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 473 F.2d 1029 (3d Cir. 1973); United
States v. Walden, 458 F.2d 36 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom Ard v. United States, 409 U.S.
867 (1972); Ramsey v. UMW, 416 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1969), rev'd, 401 U.S. 302 (1971);
Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 340 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed sub nom. Holt v.
Alleghany Corp., 384 U.S. 28 (1966).
' See Carrington, supra note 44, at 583.
6o 28 U.S.C. § 46(c)(1982).
6 See Clark v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., 684 F.2d 1208 (6th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1040 (1983); Copper & Brass Fabricators Council v. Department of
Treasury, No. 81-2091 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 3, 1982)(unpublished order denying rehearing in
bane); Curtis-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 599 F.2d 1259 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1022 (1980); Izaak Walton League, Inc. v. AEC, 515 F.2d 513 (7th Cir.), rev'd, 423
U.S. 12 (1975); Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972), affd, 414 U.S.
291 (1973). But see Arnold v. Eastern Air Lines, 712 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1040 (1984); Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008, 1012 n.1 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied sub nom. FTC v. Francis Ford, 459 U.S. 999 (1982).
62 The problem of recusals can severly hamper a court's ability to operate in banc,
especially in circuits with many judges who hold stock or who have held public office. See
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Even when conventional in banc review achieves its purposes, the costs
to the court and litigants may not justify the effort. Delay is one major
cost of conventional in banc review. Delay is almost inevitable because
the in banc court is an unwieldy decisionmaker; it lacks the benefits of
small, flexible decisionmaking conferences and rapid exchanges of draft
opinions.6 3 According to some surveys, in banc review can more than
double the time from argument to decision. 64 The chief vice of delay, of
course, is uncertainty. The longer the court takes to decide an issue, the
longer the litigants are left without direction on how to conduct their
affairs.
Conventional in banc review also creates a drag on court efficiency. The
decline in efficiency occurs in direct proportion to the number ofjudges on
the in banc panel. For example, an in banc panel of twelve judges could
be doing the work of four three-judge panels. 65 This concern for efficiency

is especially heightened by the recent "explosion" in the business of the
66
federal courts of appeals.
Conventional in banc review can also produce intangible harm to the
internal workings of appellate courts. A call for a rehearing in banc may
be perceived by the members of the original three-judge panel as
gratuitus intermeddling by the other members of the court. Moreover, in
banc review of "hard" cases about which judges hold strong feelings
67
sometimes exacerbates rather than accommodates personal differences.

R. LYNN, APPELLATE LmrGATION 230 (1985)(noting that 5th Circuit has "Gas Panel" whose
cases can never be reheard in banc because of recusal of remainder of the circuit); Harper,
The Breakdown in FederalAppeals, 70 A.B.A. J. 56, 56 (1984)(noting problems in 5th and
D.C. Circuits); Virginia Note, supra note 44, at 1538 (citing examples).
G See NYU Note, supra note 39 at 576.
In a survey conducted in the Second and D.C. Circuits, one commentator found that
cases reheard in banc took approximately five and one half times longer to reach final
decision than cases heard and disposed of by three-judge panels, and cases initially heard in
banc took approximately two and one half to three and one half times longer than cases
heard and disposed of by three-judge panels. Michigan Notes, supra note 50, at 1644.
Another survey, conducted in the Second and Third circuits, found that the average time
from argument to judgment doubled if the in banc court originally heard the case and
quadrupled if the in banc court reheard the case. NYU Note, supra note 39, at 577.
s See, e.g., Michigan Note, supra note 50, at 1644 (explaining source of inefficiency);
NYU Note, supra note 39, at 577 (same).
e6 See Bennett, Summary Dispositionof Appeals: Lessons from the D.C. Circuit, 30 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 463, 463 n.1 (1986)(citing materials on overload of federal courts of appeals). In
the year concluding in September 1985, for example, the pending caseload of the federal
courts of appeals grew by 4.6%, to a record 24,925 cases. Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, Federal Judicial Workload Statistics 5 (1985).
" See Note, The Second Circuit: Federal Judicial Administration in Microcosm, 63
COLUM. L. REV. 874, 900-08 (1963). As Chief Judge Wald has remarked, "[s]ome judges do
indeed regard a vote in favor of en bancing their cases as tantamount to a declaration of
treason." P. Wald, supra note 49, at 11.
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Although unquantifiable, this potential disruption of the personal relationships between judges is a very real concern.
IV.

"MINI" IN BANC PROCEDURES

Mini in bane proceedings respond to many of the concerns noted in Part
III. Despite the fact that no two federal circuit courts of appeals have
adopted the same mini in bane procedures, there are some significant
similarities. This Part describes the procedures in each of the circuits.
The rules are presented in declining order, from most formalized to least
formalized.
A. Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit has adopted the most formalized procedure for
mini in banc review. The Seventh Circuit judges adopted their Rule 16(e)
in 1977.68 The conflict-resolution provisions of the Seventh Circuit's rule
include four important steps:
(1) An opinion is prepared by the initial three-judge panel;
(2) The proposed opinion creates a conflict by either:
(a) Overruling a prior decision of the court, or
(b) Creating a conflict between or among circuits;
(3) The opinion is circulated to the active members of the court;
and
(4) A majority of the active judges do not vote to rehear the
case.
Although the Seventh Circuit's procedure is the most comprehensive of
the mini in banc rules, an examination of the rule in operation more fully
illustrates its scope. Since 1977, the Seventh Circuit has published
twenty-four opinions in which Rule 16(e) has been employed. A study of
those opinions yields several important observations.

6 The Seventh Circuit rule reads:
Rehearing Sua Sponte Before Decision.A proposed opinion approved by a panel
for this court adopting a position which would overrule a prior decision of this
court or create a conflict between or among circuits shall not be published unless
it is first circulated among the active members of this court and a majority of them

do not vote to rehear in banc the issue of whether the position should be adopted.
In the discretion of the panel, a proposed opinion which would establish a new rule
or procedure may be similarly circulated before it is issued. When the position is
adopted by the panel after compliance with this procedure, the opinion, when
published, shall contain a footnote worded, depending on the circumstances, in
substance as follows: This opinion has been circulated among all judges of this
court in regular active service. (No judge favored, or A majority did not favor) a
rehearing in banc on the question of (e.g., overruling Doe v. Roe.)
7th Cir. R. 16(e).
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Table III
SEVENTH CIRCUIT MINI IN BANC CASES
Cases overruling prior decisions
Cases clarifying prior decisions
Cases interpreting prior decisions in light of
Supreme Court decision
Conflict outside circuit
Rules cases
Total

9

4.5
3
2
9.5
4
23

First, although the rule also permits the in banc court to adopt new
procedures, the court has used the rule primarily to resolve conflicts.
Table III presents a categorization of the cases which illustrates this

69 In one case, the court acted under Rule 16(e) both because of a conflict with prior

Seventh Circuit law and a conflict with a case outside the circuit. Chicago & N. W. Transp.
Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 609 F.2d 1221, 1232 n.ll (7th Cir. 1979).
We divide the cases in these categories as follows:
Casesoverrulingpriordecisions: United States v. Burke, 781 F.2d 1234,1237 n.1 (7th Cir.
1985)(overruling United States v. Donnelly, 179 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1950)); Bigby v. Chicago,
766 F.2d 1053, 1055 n.* (7th Cir. 1985)(overruling DiIulio v. Board of Fire & Police
Comm'rs, 682 F.2d 666 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982)), cert. denied sub nor.
Thoele v. Chicago, 106 S. Ct. 793 (1986); Kansas City Terminal Ry. v. Jordon Mfg. Co., 750
F.2d 551, 551 n.* (7th Cir. 1984)(overruling alternative holding in Overnite Transp. Co. v.
Chicago Indus. Tire Co., 668 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1981)); Appleton Elec. Co. v. Graves Truck
Line, Inc. 635 F.2d 603, 608 (7th Cir. 1980)(noting conflict with prior opinion in same case),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 976 (1981); Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Atchison, T & S Fe Ry. Co.,
609 F.2d 1221, 1232 n.11 (7th Cir. 1979)(overruling Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Chicago,
R.I. & P. R.R., 504 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1974).
Cases clarifyingpriordecisions:Analytica, Inc. v. NPD, 708 F.2d 1263, 1265 n.* (7th Cir.
1983)(indicating that opinion was circulated because of dissenting opinion suggesting that
it is in conflict with prior decisions); Norris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899, 899 n.* (7th Cir.
1982)(arguable conflict with Guzzardo v. Bengston, 643 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 941 (1981)); Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1091 n.* (7th Cir. 1982)(noting
potential conflict with statements in prior opinions).
Cases interpretingprior decisions in light of Supreme Court decision: Pridegon v. Gates
Credit Union, 683 F.2d 182, 194 (7th Cir. 1982)(overruling Smith v. No. 2 Galesburg Crown
Fin. Corp., 615 F.2d 407 (7th Cir. 1980) in light of intervening Supreme court precedent);
Zeigler Coal Co. v. Local 1870, 566 F.2d 582, 585 (7th Cir. 1977)(overruling Inland Steel Co.
v. UMW, 505 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1974) in light of intervening Supreme Court precedent),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 912 (1978).
Conflict outside circuit: Watkins v. Blinzinger, 789 F.2d 474, 476 n.4 (7th Cir. 1986);
Graczyk v. USW, 763 F.2d 256, 256 n.* (7th Cir.)(noting conflict with Anness v. USW, 707
F.2d 917 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 335 (1985); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v.
Mead Johnson & Co., 737 F.2d 683, 683-84 n.* (7th Cir.)(noting disagreement with Johnson
Machine Works, Inc. v. Chicago, B & Q R.R., 297 F.2d 793 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 982 (1984); Allison v. Liberty Say., 695 F.2d 1086, 1086 n.* (7th Cir. 1982)(noting
conflict with Vega v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc., 622 F.2d 918 (6th Cir. 1980)); King v.
IRS, 688 F.2d 488,488 n.* (7th Cir. 1982)(noting conflict with Long v. IRS, 596 F.2d 362 (9th
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point. Indeed, according to the Circuit Executive for the Seventh Circuit,
"[t]he purpose of adopting this rule was to allow the court to overrule
prior decisions without having to have an en banc hearing and to forestall
the issuance of opinions in conflict with other circuits which would be
later vacated by the en banc court. 70° The additional rule-change function
appears to have been a secondary concern.
Although Rule 16(e) does not explicitly so state, any mini in banc
decision is rendered without prejudice to a further request for rehearing
and suggestion for rehearing in bane. Thus, for example, in Analytica,
Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc.,71 Judge Wood stated that he would not vote on
the Rule 16(e) question,
preferring to have the benefit of the parties' arguments made on
petition for rehearing with suggestion for rehearing en bane,
should such a petition be filed after they have had an opportunity
before he votes on
to study the majority and dissenting opinions,
72
whether the case should be heard en banc.
Although mini in banc proceedings do not tax court resources as much
as conventional in banc reviews do, the Seventh Circuit still uses the
process sparingly. For example, Rule 16(e) is interpreted literally to
require that the case to be given mini in banc treatment creates a new
conflict with other circuits. If a conflict between circuits already exists,

Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 917 (1980) and Neufeld v. IRS, 646 F.2d 661 (D.C. Cir.
1981)); Gallagher & Ascher Co. v. Simon, 687 F.2d 1067, 1073 (7th Cir. 1982)(noting conflict
with New York Pathological & X-Ray Laboratories, Inc. v. INS, 523 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1975)
and Izaak Walton League, Inc. v. NRC, 606 F.2d 1363 (D.C. Cir. 1979)); Northwest Hospital
Inc. v. Hospital Serv. Corp., 687 F.2d 985, 985 n.* (7th Cir. 1982)(noting conflict with Goleta
Valley Community Hosp. v. Schweiker, 647 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1981)); Dickinson v. Heinold
Sec., Inc. 661 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1981); Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Atchison, T & S. Fe
Ry. Co., 609 F.2d 1221, 1232 (7th Cir. 1979)(noting conflict with Thompson v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry., 218 F.2d 166 (8th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 964 (1955)); Davis v.
Califano, 603 F.2d 618,626 (7th Cir. 1979)(noting conflict with Rosenberg v. Richardson, 538
F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1976)).
Rules cases: United States ex rel. Leonard v. O'Leary, 788 F.2d 1238, 1238 n.* (7th Cir.
1986); Gaertner v. United States, 763 F.2d 787 (7th Cir.)(FED. R. CanM. P. 35(b)), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 535 (1985); United States v. First State Bank, 691 F.2d 332, 336 (7th Cir.
1982)(requirement to include notice of recent decision in show cause orders for certain tax
cases); United States v. Kis, 658 F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1981)(tax summons enforcement
proceedings), cert. denied sub nom. Salkin v. United States, 455 U.S. 1018 (1982); Photovest
Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 731 n.41 (7th Cir. 1979)(exchange of briefs procedure
in district court), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980).
70 Letter from Collins T. Fitzpatrick, Circuit Executive for the Seventh Circuit, to
Authors (Feb. 25, 1986).
71 Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983).
72 Id. at 1265 n.*.
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Rule 16(e) does not apply. Thus, in Milwaukee County v. Donovan,73 an
opinion of a three-judge panel was initially circulated to the full court
because it created a conflict with opinions from the Third and Ninth
Circuits. While the opinion was circulating, however, the Second circuit
adopted a position contrary to the other two circuits. Because no new
opinion, the Rule 16(e) submission to
conflict was created by the proposed
74
the full court was withdrawn.
Rule 16(e) also does not require unanimity on an issue. In this sense, it
truly operates as a mini in banc hearing. In at least five of the Seventh
Circuit mini in banc cases, one or more of the judges preferred to rehear
the case in banc rather than issue the opinion without full consideration.7 5 Where judges dissented, moreover, dissenting votes were simply
noted; no separate dissenting opinions issued. In at least three cases,
however, the Rule 16(e) suggestion was rejected, and the court proceeded
76
to rehear the case in banc.
B. Second Circuit
Unlike the Seventh Circuit's Rule 16(e), the Second Circuit's mini in
banc rule is "entirely informal and is not set forth in any local rule or
elsewhere." 77 In general, however, the procedure is similar to that
employed by the Seventh Circuit. If a three-judge panel determines that
its opinion should be circulated to the full court prior to publication, the
judges then exchange memos, and the opinion may be revised. When the
opinion is published, it will sometimes note that it has been circulated to
the full court. The purpose of this approach is "to give the entire court the
opportunity to have input into opinions in controversial,7 unusual and/or
important cases, and to insure uniformity of decisions."

" Milwaukee County v. Donovan, 771 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub non.
Milwaukee County v. Brock, 106 S. Ct. 2246 (1986).
74 Id. at 983 n.*. See KwIBB, supra note 58, at 284 ('This process does not foreclose a
party's suggestion that a case should be reheard or reheard in banc, but it obviously places
a heavier burden on such a petition.").
71 See Gaertner v. United States, 763 F.2d 787, 788 (7th Cir.)(four judges dissenting),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 535 (1985); Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263,
1265 (7th Cir. 1983)(two judges dissenting, one abstaining); Norris v. United States, 687
F.2d 899, 899 (7th Cir. 1982)(three judges dissenting); Allison v. Liberty Say., 695 F.2d
1086, 1086 (7th Cir. 1982)(two judges dissenting); Davis v. Califano, 603 F.2d 618, 626 (7th
Cir. 1979)(one judge dissenting).
76 United States ex rel. Teague v. Lane, 779 F.2d 1332 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Gometz, 730 F.2d 475, 477 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 845 (1984); Mosey Mfg. Co., Inc.
v. NLRB, 701 F.2d 610, 611 (7th Cir. 1983).
77 Letter from Geoffrey A. Mort, Program Analyst, Office of the Circuit Executive for the
Second Circuit, to Authors (Feb. 24, 1986). The Second Circuit procedure is commonly
referred to as "junior en banc." Id.
78 Id.
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SECOND CIRCUIT MINI IN BANC CASES
Cases overruling prior decisions
Cases clarifying prior decisions
Cases interpreting prior decisions in light of
Supreme Court decision
Rules cases
Allegations of judicial misconduct
Total
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10
3
2
1
1
17

Because the Second Circuit approach is so informal, the scope of its
operation becomes apparent only after an examination of the cases in
which it has been employed. These cases demonstrate several important
dimensions of the procedure. First, the Second Circuit most often uses the
procedure to overrule or clarify its own precedent. As illustrated in Table
IV, a survey of the seventeen unreported cases employing the mini in
banc approach reveals that conflicts with other circuits have never been
cited as justification for the mini in banc procedure.
Parallel to the Seventh Circuit's Rule 16(e), the Second Circuit may
issue a mini in banc opinion with less than a unanimous vote. In five of
the seventeen cases surveyed, the vote to issue the mini in banc opinion

" We divide the cases into the following categories:
Cases overruling prior decisions: United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477, 478 n.1 (2d Cir.
1985)(overruling United States v. Brothman, 191 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1951)); Trapnell v. United
States, 725 F.2d 149, 155 (2d Cir. 1983)(overruling United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376 (2d
Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 950 (1950)); B.K. Instrument, Inc. v. United States, 715
F.2d 713, 717 (2d Cir. 1983)(overruling Edelman v. FHA, 382 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1967));
United States v. Roglieri, 700 F.2d 883, 887 (2d Cir. 1983)(limiting United States v.
Robinson, 545 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1976)); Mitsui & Co., Ltd. v. American Export Lines, Inc.,
636 F.2d 807, 821 (2d Cir. 1981)(overruling Royal Typewriter Co. v. M/V Kulmerlan, 483
F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1973)); Lee v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 592 F.2d 39, 44 (2d Cir.
1979)(overruling Greenberg v. Arsenal Bldg. Corp., 144 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1944), rev'd on
othergrounds sub nom. Brooklyn Say. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1945)); United States
v. Ramos, 572 F.2d 360, 364 (2d Cir. 1978)(dissenting opinion)(suggesting that majority
opinion overrules United States v. Robin, 553 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977)); United States v. Taylor,
464 F.2d 240, 244 (2d Cir. 1972)(overruling United States v. Feinberg, 140 F.2d 592 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 726 (1944)); United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 608 (2d Cir.
1966)(overruling Second Circuit M'Naghten rule); United States v. Malafronte, 357 F.2d
629 (2d Cir. 1966)(same).
Cases clarifying prior decisions: United States v. Ingredient Technology Corp., 698 F.2d
88, 99 (2d Cir.)(clarifying United States v. Kelin, 247 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 924 (1958) and United States v. Witt, 215 F.2d 580 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Talanker v. United States, 348 U.S. 887 (1954)), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1131 (1983); Maiorino
v. Branford Sav. Bank, 691 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1982)(clarifying In re Riddervold, 647 F.2d
342 (2d Cir. 1981)); United States ex rel. Moore v. Follette, 425 F.2d 925, 927 (2d
Cir.)(clarifying United States ex rel. Vanderhorst v. LaVallee, 417 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1970),
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was less than unanimous.1° In only one case, however, was a full
dissenting opinion entered.81 In one other case, the three-judge panel's
was apparently rejected, and the
suggestion of mini in banc treatment
82
case received full in banc treatment.
In contrast to conventional in banc practice, the Second Circuit does not
always note the fact that a case has been given mini in banc treatment.
In United States v. Jacobs,8 3 the court explained, for the first time, that
a prior opinion had received mini in banc treatment. The court noted that
"[w]e did not mention this originally because we deemed it an internal
matter."4 Even when the court mentions that a case has been decided
approach, the court does not always note the exact
under the mini in banc
85
votes of the judges.
On occasion, the Second Circuit has referred mini in banc opinions both
to active judges and to senior judges. In Maiorino v. Branford Say.
Bank,86 the court circulated the opinion to senior judges who were
members of the panel that decided an earlier case clarified by the
Maiorino opinion. In United States v. Jacobs,87 the court simply stated
that a previous opinion had been circulated before filing to all active and
senior judges of the circuit.88 Ordinarily, senior circuit judges are only

cert. denied, 398 U.S. 966 (1970), cert. denied sub nom. McMann v. Vanderhorst, 397 U.S.

925 (1970)).
Cases interpretingcircuitlaw in light of Supreme Court decision:Boothe v. Hammock, 605

F.2d 661, 663 (2d Cir. 1979); Grimes v. United States, 607 F.2d 6, 16 (2d Cir. 1979).
Rules cases: United States v. Jacobs, 547 F.2d 772, 773 n.2 (2d Cir. 1976)(requiring that
United States attorney inform potential defendant that he is target of investigation prior to
appearance before grand jury), cert. dismissed, 436 U.S. 31 (1978).
Allegations of judicial misconduct: In re Phillips, 510 F.2d 126, 127 (2d Cir. 1975)(allegation that district judge should have recused himself because of ex parte contacts).
so See United States v. Taylor, 464 F.2d 240, 244 n.2 (2d Cir. 1972)(one judge suggesting
formal in banc); United States v. Ramos, 572 F.2d 360, 363 (2d Cir. 1978)(one judge
dissenting); United States v. Jacobs, 547 F.2d 772, 773 (2d Cir. 1976)(one judge not
responding; one judge dissenting), cert. dismissed, 436 U.S. 31 (1978); In re Phillips, 510
F.2d 126, 127 (2d Cir. 1975)(two judges disqualified); United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d
606, 607 n.* (2d Cir. 1966)(one judge taking no position on opinion).
" United States v. Ramos, 572 F.2d 360, 363 (2d Cir. 1978)(Timbers, J., dissenting).
82 United States v. Drummond, 354 F.2d 132, 156 (2d Cir. 1965)(Waterman, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1013 (1966).
"' United States v. Jacobs, 547 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 436 U.S. 31
(1978).
8 Id. at 773 n.2.
85 See United States v. Jacobs, 547 F.2d 772, 773 n.2 (2d Cir. 1976)(noting only tally of
votes, without names), cert. dismissed, 436 U.S. 31 (1978); In re Phillips, 510 F.2d 126, 127
(2d Cir. 1975)(noting tally, without names of recused judges). Judge Newman, in a recent
Article, also mentioned this phenomenon. Newman, supra note 55, at 382.
se Maiorino v. Branford Sav. Bank, 691 F.2d 89, 94 n.* (2d Cir. 1982).
87 United States v. Jacobs, 547 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 436 U.S. 31
(1978).
88 Id.
at 773 n.2.
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permitted to sit on the in banc rehearing of cases on which they sat as a
member of the original panel.8 9 The Second Circuit practice may be
justified on the ground that such circulation to senior judges is done to
gather their views and not to solicit their votes.
Finally, apart from its primary mini in banc procedures, the Second
Circuit has, on at least one occasion, adopted a procedure for resolving
cases where separate panels have considered the same issue and intend to
reach different conclusions. In a recent speech, Judge Kaufman described
a situation in which three different panels had to determine the elements
of a civil RICO action. 90 Because the three panels intended to reach
different conclusions, some judges suggested that the court review all
three cases in banc. The court later agreed, however, to let one panel take
the lead on the issue, thus establishing a precedent that the other two
would follow. 9' This procedure avoided the need for in banc treatment
92
altogether.
C. D.C. Circuit
In 1981, the D.C. Circuit issued Irons v. Diamond,9 3 which suggested
for the first time the possibility of using a mini in banc procedure in that
94
circuit. The Irons case had already been to the D.C. Circuit three times,
and the court found two of these prior opinions in "irreconcilable"

" See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c)(1982)("A court in banc shall consist of all circuit judges in
regular active service ... except that any senior circuit judge of the circuit shall be eligible
to participate ... as a member of an in banc court reviewing a decision of a panel of which
such judge was a member.") Congress removed the authority of senior judges to sit in banc
in 1978, Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 5(a)(2), 92 Stat. 1629, 1633, because of
the administrative problems presented in large circuits. S. REP. No. 117, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 52 (1977). Congress restored the authority in 1982, Federal Courts Improvement Act
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 205,96 Stat. 25,53, citing concerns that judges were reluctant
to take senior status if it meant they were to be denied the right to sit in banc. S. REP. No.
275, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1981).
9' 1. Kaufman, Remarks at the Second Circuit Judicial Conference on the En Banc
Proceedings 11 (Sept. 14, 1984).
91 Id. (noting that voting memos indicated that an in banc hearing would likely have
created an even more uncertainty).
92 The series of cases included: Sedima v. Imrex, 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984) rev'd 473
U.S. 479 (1985); Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984); and Furman v.
Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated sub nom. Joel v. Cirrito, 105 S. Ct. 3550 (1985).
The fact that this procedure was used is nowhere noted in any of the cases in the Sedima
trilogy.
" Irons v. Diamond, 670 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
14 Irons & Sears v. Dann, 606 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom. Irons &
Sears v. Commissioner of Patents & Trademarks, 444 U.S. 1075 (1980); Irons v. Gottschalk,
548 F.2d 992 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nor. Irons v. Parker, 434 U.S. 965 (1977);
Irons v. Schuyler, 465 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Irons v. Commissioner of
Patents, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972).
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conflict.95 The court declined to resolve the inconsistency on a law of the
case rationale, noting however, that "this path would lead us out of the
present thicket, [but] would do little if anything to cut away the tangled
legal underbrush and clarify the controlling law in this circuit."96
Instead, the court circulated the opinion to the full court for consideration. In recognition of this procedure, the court provided a footnote:
"[t]he foregoing part of the division's decision, because it resolves an
apparent conflict between two prior decisions, has been separately
considered and approved by the full court, and thus constitutes the law of
97
the circuit."
The D.C. Circuit has not implemented the "Irons footnote" procedure
by rule. Instead, the court has detailed the scope of the procedure by
example in each new case. Since Irons, the court has used the procedure
only four times. In one case, 98 the court used the Irons footnote to overrule
language in a prior opinion in the same case,9 9 a result similar to the
situation in Irons itself. In two other cases, the court used the procedure
to overrule dicta from prior cases.100 In the fourth instance,' 0 the court
used the Irons footnote procedure expressly to resolve inconsistencies in
prior decisions. 102 The resolution of conflicts in prior opinions, according
to Judge Edwards of the D.C. Circuit, is one of the express purposes of the
03
Irons footnote.'
Unfortunately, the D.C. Circuit's mini in banc procedure remains
undeveloped in several areas. It is unclear, for example, whether an Irons
footnote could be adopted with a less than unanimous vote from the full
court.' 0

4

In addition, the court has not yet used the Irons procedure to

overrule a precedent, as opposed to resolving conflicts in prior opinions or
°5
clarifying prior dicta.1

9' Irons v. Diamond, 670 F.2d 267.
96 Id. at 268.
97 Id. at 268 n.10.
9

Londrigan v. FBI, 722 F.2d 840 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

s Id. at 844 (suggesting that language in first opinion may be inappropriate).
100 Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 16 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(referring to "passing and conclusory
remark" in a prior opinion), cert. denied sub nom. Brennan v. Hobson, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985);
CFTC v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487, 496 n. 19 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(noting that prior opinion contained
assumption of jurisdiction).
101 Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
102 Id. at 75 n.24.
o Edwards, supra note 42, at 638.
104 See P. Wald, supra note 49, at n.27 (suggesting that less than a unanimous vote might

be permitted).
'05 See id. suggesting that Irons procedure is reserved for resolution of "minor annoyances" in circuit precedent). But cf. Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355, 1357 (D.C. Cir.
1983)(Bork, J., concurring)(suggesting that Irons requires that proposed changes in law of
the circuit be submitted to the full court), cert. denied 467 U.S. 1251 (1984).
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D. Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit has not adopted a formal rule governing mini in
banc proceedings. Circuit practice, however, requires that all panel
opinions be circulated to the entire court, including both active and senior
judges.' 0 6 Any active judge may request a poll of the court on whether to
review a case in banc. If no poll is requested, the opinion is issued without
the imprimatur of the full court. If an opinion is filed which is contrary to
an earlier decision of the court, a footnote may be appended stating that
the earlier decision is no longer valid and that the statement is made with
107
the approval of the entire court.
The Tenth Circuit has used this informal procedure exclusively to
overrule precedent. In Wiley v. Rayl, 08 the court used the procedure to
overrule a case that had been superseded by Supreme Court precedent. 0 9
In EEOC v. Gaddis,"0 the court simply overruled two prior cases."'
Perhaps due to its informality, the Tenth Circuit approach remains
ill-defined. For example, the court has not indicated whether a mini in
banc opinion can issue with a less than unanimous vote of the active
judges.112

E. Fourth Circuit
3
In the Fourth Circuit, every proposed opinion in an argued case" is
circulated to every circuit judge, including senior judges, and their
comments are solicited." 4 The aim of this solicitation of comments is to
promote a collegial attitude among the members of the court and to
maintain uniformity of decisions within the circuit. 1 5 Ordinarily, the

.06Letter from Robert L. Hoecker, Chief Deputy Clerk, Tenth Circuit, to Author (Feb. 27,
1986).
107

Id.

.o Wiley v. Rayl, 767 F.2d 679 (10th Cir. 1985).
' See id. at 681 n.2 (overruling Hux v. Murphy, 733 F.2d 737 (10th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 472 U.S. 1022 (1985)).

110 EEOC v. Gaddis, 733 F.2d 1373 (10th Cir. 1984).
"I Id. at 1377 n.3 (overruling Shah v. Halliburton, 627 F.2d 1055 (10th Cir. 1980) and
Zuniga v. AMFAC Foods, Inc., 580 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1978)).
112 In Wiley, the court noted that the poll of the activejudges was unanimous. Wiley, 767

F.2d at 681 n.2. In Gaddis, the court noted only that one judge did not participate. Gaddis,
733 F.2d at 1377 n.3.
11' The Circuit Executive for the Fourth Circuit emphasized that these procedures apply
only to argued cases. Proposed opinions for submitted cases are not always circulated to
every member of the court. Letter from Samuel W. Phillips, Circuit Executive for the
Fourth Circuit, to Authors (May 27, 1986).
".. Fourth Circuit Internal Operating Procedure 36.2 ("When a proposed opinion in an
argued case is prepared and submitted to other panel members, copies are provided to the
non-sitting judges including the senior judges and their comments are solicited.")
...Letter from Samuel W. Phillips, Fourth Circuit Executive, to Author (Feb. 24, 1986).
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and does not
issued opinion does not identify the panel members' votes
116
indicate whether the full court has adopted the opinion.
In at least one published opinion, however, the court specifically
indicated that the opinion had been circulated to all members of the court
and that a majority had agreed with the opinion.117 The opinion proposed
to confine a prior opinion to its particular facts. 1'8
The Fourth Circuit procedure leaves several open questions. For
example, the procedure does not elucidate how often opinions overruling
prior decisions receive full court approval without explicit notation of
that fact in the opinion.

F. Eighth Circuit
Like the D.C., Second and Tenth Circuits, the Eighth Circuit also lacks
a formal procedure for pre-issuance opinion review by the full court." 9
Indeed, the court's Internal Operating Procedures do not even suggest
that panel opinions are ever circulated to the full court prior to publica0

tion.12

Although the Internal Operating Procedures provide for no such mini
in banc procedure, the Eighth Circuit has employed a truncated in banc
review on occasion. In United States v. Kasto,1' 2 the court indicated that
the opinion had been circulated to the active judges on the court and that
a majority of the active judges approved the overruling of a prior
decision. 122 In another opinion, In re Multi-Piece Rim Prods. Liab.
Litig., 23 the court seemed to indicate that the same procedure had been
used, noting that "[this opinion has been circulated to the court en banc,
and all active judges concur."' 124 The heading on the Rim Prods. opinion,
however, states that the court was sitting in banc. 125 The court did not
state whether it actually sat in banc or whether it merely approved a

116 Id.
117

Bell v. United States, 521 F.2d 713, 715 n.3 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918

(1976).

s Id. (referring to Paige v. United States, 443 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1971)).

119 Letter from Sheila Greenbaum, Eighth Circuit Senior Staff Attorney, to Authors

(Feb. 28, 1986).
120 Eighth Circuit Internal Operating Procedures VI(A)(noting only that proposed
opinions are circulated to other panel members).
121 United States v. Katso, 584 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979).
122 Id. at 272 n.4 (overruling Packineau v. United States, 202 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1953)).
123 In re Multi-Piece Rim Prods. Liab. Litig., 612 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1980), vacated sub
nom. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981).
124 Id. at 378 n.2.
125 Id. at 377. In addition, the docket sheet for the case apparently states that the case
was submitted without oral argument and "en banc." Letter from Sheila Greenbaum, Senior
Staff Attorney, Eighth Circuit, to Authors (May 29, 1986).
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panel opinion.126 The Rim Prods. opinion, like the Kasto opinion, over127
ruled a prior decision.
G. Federal Circuit
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, newest of the federal
courts of appeals, does not have a formal mini in banc procedure. There
is, however, a procedure whereby any judge at any time may request an
in banc poll of the circuit judges in regular active service to determine if
the case should be considered in banc. If a majority of the active judges
agree, the case will be considered in banc, but review may not involve
further briefing and oral argument. 128 In at least one published opinion,
the court used a form of mini in banc review. In Zenith Radio Corp. v.
United States, the appellant attacked one of the court's prior opinions and
suggested that in banc reviews might be the appropriate technique for
dealing with that precedent. 29 The three-judge panel refused to overrule
the prior opinion and denied the in banc suggestion, noting that "[t]his
opinion has been circulated to the entire court prior to issuance, and no
130
judge endorsed the suggestion [to hear the case in banc]."
This single opinion leaves many unanswered questions. The Federal
Circuit has not affirmatively stated that the procedure could be used to
overrule a prior opinion without a formal in banc hearing. Moreover, the
voting requirements of this shortened in banc review remain undefined.
H. Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit does not ordinarily circulate panel opinions to the full
court.L3 3 Court policy does require, however, that "[p]anel opinions which

126 Ordinarily, when the Eighth Circuit sits in banc, the court indicates the procedural

posture of the case. See, e.g., Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1319 (8th Cir. 1985)(in banc)
(indicating that initial three-judge panel had reversed district court order); Flittie v. Solem,

775 F.2d 933, 935 (8th Cir. 1985)(in banc)(indicating that initial three-judge panel had
affirmed district court order), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1223 (1986).
127 Rim Prods., 612 F.2d at 378 (overruling Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d
602 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978) and Arkansas v. Dean Food Prods. Co.,
605 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1979)).
128 Letter from Francis X. Gindhart, Federal Circuit Clerk of Court, to Authors (August
12, 1986). Because the court's internal operating procedures prohibit a panel from
overruling or conflicting with precedent, the only option available to accomplish this is in

banc consideration. Id.
129 Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 783 F.2d 184, 186 (Fed. Cir. 1986)(referring to
Smith Corona Group Consumer Products Division, SCM Corp. v. United States, 713 F.2d
1568 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1022 (1984)).
130 Id. at 186 n.3. Though pre-issuance circulation to all the judges is required as a way
to eliminate conflicts with precedent, it is not an in bane procedure. Letter, supra note 128.
131 Letter from Lydia G. Comberrel, Circuit Executive for the Fifth Circuit, to Authors
(Feb. 25, 1986).
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create conflict between circuits are to be pre-circulated to all active
judges. '132 The Fifth Circuit has used this procedure to review intercircuit conflict cases in at least two published opinions. 13 3 These opinions
to
make clear that a mere majority vote of the active judges is sufficient
3
approve a panel opinion that creates a conflict with another circuit.1 4 If
a majority of the court favors en banc rehearing, the initial three-judge
panel decision may be published, even though it will be subsequently
The court has never used
vacated by the vote to hear the case in banc.' 35
136
this procedure to overrule its own precedent.
I. Third Circuit
In the Third Circuit, draft opinions are circulated to all active judges.
This circulation acts as a request for notification if in banc consideration
is deemed appropriate. 3 7 The court does not appear to have adopted or
implemented any other mini in banc procedure.
J. Sixth Circuit
Sixth Circuit rules explicitly prevent one panel from overruling the
published opinion of a prior panel. Thus, in banc consideration is required
to overrule a prior published opinion.138 The rules permit any active
judge or member of the original hearing panel to call for in banc
consideration of the case, even without a request for rehearing by one of
the parties. 139 The court does not appear, however, to have considered any
140
mini in banc procedure.

132

Id. This statement of policy is not contained in the court's local rules.

133 Fuel Oil Supply & Terminaling v. Gulf Oil Corp., 762 F.2d 1283, 1284 n.* (5th Cir.

1985); United States v. Cronn, 717 F.2d 164, 165 n.* (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S.
1217 (1984).
134 See, e.g., Fuel Oil, 762 F.2d at 1284 n.* (noting that a majority of active judges did not
call for in banc rehearing).
135 See Dunagin v. Oxford, 718 F.2d 738, 740 n.2 (5th Cir. 1983)(noting that opinion in
Lamar Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Mississippi State Tax Comm'n, 701 F.2d 314 (5th Cir.
1983) was issued even though vacated after in banc poll), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1984).
136 The Fifth Circuit has used the full in bane procedure to overrule some cases. See, e.g.,
Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc. 783 F.2d 1296, 1297 (5th Cir.)(in banc)(overruling Olympic Towing Corp. v. Nebel Towing Co., 419 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S 989 (1970), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 87 (1986)); United States v. Henry, 749 F.2d 203,
206 n.2 (5th Cir. 1984)(in banc)(overruling several cases).
137 Third Circuit Internal Operating Procedure 5(c)(5).
135 Sixth Circuit Internal Operating Procedures § 11.3.
139 Id. at § 12.2.
140 Letter from James A. Higgins, Circuit Executive for the Sixth Circuit, to Authors
(Feb. 24, 1986)("The Sixth Circuit has not adopted a procedure whereby the en bane court
may review all or part of an opinion before it is issued by a panel. Insofar as Iam aware, the
Sixth Circuit has never considered the adoption of such a procedure.").
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K. FirstCircuit
The First Circuit, with only five active judges, is least likely to conduct in banc proceedings. 14 1 Nevertheless, under appropriate circumstances, the court may consider conducting such proceedings. 142 The
court does not have any formal procedure for circulating drafts of
opinions to non-panel members and has not adopted any mini in banc
procedure.
L. Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit is the only circuit to have established the in banc
court as a group containing fewer than all the active judges of the
circuit. 43 Ninth Circuit procedure establishes in bane courts consisting of
the chiefjudge plus ten additional active judges drawn by lot. 144 Because

the composition of any particular in banc court cannot be determined in
advance, circulation of draft opinions to the in banc court is impossible.1456
Although the Ninth Circuit has not adopted a mini in banc procedure,14
the office of staff attorneys is charged with the responsibility of reviewing
all dispositions and does bring potential conflicts to the attention of
concerned panels.147

M. Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit policy is for each panel to send its opinions
directly to the Clerk of Court for issuance. Opinions are not circulated to
non-panel members for their comments. 148 Panels may occasionally
discover, however, that they have related cases or cases raising similar
issues. In that event, communication between the judges' chambers can
occur. There is, however, no institutionalized rule for review of draft

141 In the one-year period ended June 30, 1985, the First Circuit was the only circuit in

which there were no cases terminated as a result in banc proceedings. ANN. REP., supra note
46, at 121 (Table 7).
142 See United States v. Martorano, 620 F.2d 912, 920 (1st Cir. 1980)(suggesting that
policies behind in banc rule apply as much to First Circuit as to other courts), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 952 (1980).
141 In 28 U.S.C. § 46(c)(1982), Congress provided that the in banc court may consist of
fewer than all the circuit judges in regular active service.
144 Ninth Circuit Local Rule 25.

1 Letter from Cathy A. Catterson, Ninth Circuit Clerk of Court, to Authors (Mar. 18,
1986).
148 Id. ("the Ninth Circuit has not adopted a procedure whereby the en banc court may
review all or part of an opinion before it is issued by a panel").
147 Letter from Cathy A. Catterson, Ninth Circuit Clerk of Court, to Authors (May 28,

1986).
14 Letter from Miguel J. Cortez, Jr., Eleventh Circuit Chief Deputy Clerk, to Authors
(Feb. 26, 1986).
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opinions.149 Nor has the court ever published an opinion making reference to such a procedure.
V.

POTENTIAL CRITICISMS OF MINI IN BANC PROCEDURES

As the above survey indicates, most federal courts of appeals have not
adopted formal procedures for truncated in banc review. Not surprisingly,
the informal procedures that courts do follow have received very little
critical commentary. This Part will discuss potential objections to mini in
banc review. In general, for these purposes, we concern ourselves with a
rule, like that of the Seventh Circuit, which permits a three-judge panel
to overrule a prior opinion of the court by circulating an opinion to the
active judges of the court for their approval. 150
A. Ineffectiveness
Mini in banc procedures will not withstand critical scrutiny unless they
are effective in accomplishing their primary purpose. As the survey
presented in Part II reveals, it appears that the general purpose of mini
in banc procedures is to provide a more efficient method of resolving
conflict cases. We can thus divide the effectiveness issue into two
component questions. First, do these mini in banc procedures actually
resolve conflicts? Second, are these procedures more efficient than
ordinary in banc proceedings?
Conflict resolution

1.

At least two different measures indicate the effectiveness of mini in
banc procedure in resolving conflicts. First, if such procedures produce
unanimous results in most cases, we may deem the conflict reviewed in
these proceedings more effectively resolved. As discussed earlier, conventional in banc proceedings tend to encourage continued uncertainty
because in banc opinions are rarely unanimous.' 5 ' By contrast, mini in
banc proceedings are much more likely to be unanimous. Of a sample of
152
thirty-five conflict cases decided in the Second and Seventh Circuits,
dissenting votes were cast in only six cases (17.1 percent). In only one of
those cases (2.8 percent of the total) was a full dissenting opinion entered.
These figures compare to the nearly 50 percent dissent rate with
153
conventional in banc proceedings.
Second, the degree to which mini in banc cases resolve the question
presented once and for all may be a good proxy for the effectiveness of

149

Id.

150 See supra text accompanying notes 68-70 (describing Seventh Circuit procedure).
151 See supra text accompanying notes 52-56.
152 See supra notes 69, 79 (listing cases).
153 See supra text accompanying notes 52-54.
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such procedures. Of the thirty-five mini in banc conflict cases from the
Second and Seventh Circuits, none were later overruled, questioned,
limited, or criticized by the court that decided the case.
2.

Efficiency

Conventional in banc proceedings are often extremely time consuming. 154 Mini in banc proceedings have proven to be much more efficient.
For example, the Second Circuit requires an average of 14.5 months to
finally decide a case that involves an in banc rehearing. 15 5 By comparison, in the fifteen mini in banc conflict cases heard in that circuit, the
court required an average of only 3.36 months to reach a decision. Similar
results obtain in the Seventh Circuit. That court requires an average of
12.6 months to finally decide an in banc case that includes an in banc
rehearing. 15 6 In the present authors' survey of twenty mini in banc
conflict cases, however, the court required an average of only 8.3 months
to reach a decision.
The mini in banc procedure is efficient by design. The procedure
generally produces only one opinion. 15 7 This factor alone plays an
important role in improving efficiency, as judges generally find the
production of written opinions the most time consuming of all judicial
tasks. 158 With the mini in banc procedure, the initial panel opinion is
drafted and circulated to the full court; the panel need not await
additional concurring and dissenting statements.
The mini in banc procedure is also extremely efficient because it
narrows the focus of the full court's attention. Traditional in banc cases
bring a complete range of issues before the full court. The parties produce
new briefs and may address all the issues that were presented to the
original panel. The mini in banc procedure, by contrast, focuses the
court's attention on a single question: should the panel opinion stand,
despite the conflict with other precedent? Essentially, the full court need
only read the panel opinion and the cases with which it conflicts to
determine the answer to this question. Of course, if the issue presented in
the mini in banc review is too complicated for this summary disposition,
members of the full court can call for a full hearing in banc.

154 See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
' We surveyed ten recently published Second Circuit in banc cases to develop this
average. We measured the period from date of original argument to date of final in banc
decision.
i6 See supra note 155 (describing method for developing average figure).
1,7 See supra text accompanying notes 80-82 (relating Seventh Circuit experience with
procedure).
' See Bork, Dealing with the Overload in Article III Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231, 233 (1976).
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B. Threats to Stare Decisis
Most federal circuit courts of appeals have adopted a rule that one
three-judge panel cannot overrule the decision of another three-judge
panel. These rules, of course, protect the principle of stare decisis. 159 Mini
in banc procedures, to the extent that they make overruling circuit
precedent easier, post a potential threat to stare decisis. A rapid turnover
in judges on a court, for example, could result in sudden shifts in
controlling law.' 60
The empirical answer to this problem is that it does not appear that
courts that use the mini in banc procedure have suffered wide swings in
precedent. The experience of the Second Circuit, which has used the
procedure to overrule prior decisions more often than any other court,
demonstrates the point. In its ten mini in banc cases overruling prior
decisions, the average elapsed time between the overruled decision and
the mini in banc decision was 27.7 years. The shortest time was seven
years. These figures suggest that the mini in banc procedure is most often
used to overrule precedent that has so obviously eroded that a full in banc
hearing is not required to overrule it.161
Moreover, the existence of mini in banc procedures does not mean that
judges are no longer aware of the role of stare decisis in our jurisprudence.1 62 This awareness of the concern for stare decisis should restrain
judges from too quickly changing precedent. This is precisely the kind of
concern, moreover, that judges who find themselves in the minority could
press on their colleagues as a justification for sending a case to the full
court for conventional in banc rehearing. Indeed, a judge could effectively
stake out such a demand by threatening to publish an opinion dissenting
from the use of the mini in banc procedure. Given that kind of pressure,
the matter would probably not be treated with the mini in banc
163
procedure.
A final theoretical point is that stare decisis is not a goal in itself.
Rather, the rule of stare decisis serves to promote certainty and predictability in the law. It is important to note that the mini in banc procedure
serves the same purpose. The mini in banc procedure can resolve conflicts

" See supra note 37.
160 See P. Wald, supra note 49, at 4 (suggesting that changes in composition of the D.C.

circuit have resulted in rapid changes in circuit precedent).
161 One Second Circuit opinion explicitly makes this point: "Although we would normally
invoke in banc consideration before taking such a step [overruling United States v.
Feinberg, 140 F.2d 592 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 726 (1944)], Feinberg has already

been so eroded that we have deemed it sufficient to circulate this opinion to the judges in
regular active service, all of whom have expressed approval of the ruling here made."
United States v. Taylor, 464 F.2d 240, 244 (2d Cir. 1972).
162 See supra note 36.

1 Chief Judge Wald has described at least two cases in the D.C. Circuit where this
scenario was played out. P. Wald, supra note 49, at n.27.
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in precedent, thus promoting certainty. That beneficial effect balances
against the changes in precedent necessarily required to resolve conflicts.
C. Mistakes
The mini in banc procedure could be seen as permitting too casual a
decision-making process, thus leading to inadequately considered decisions. 16 4 A case from the Second Circuit illustrates this potential problem. In UnitedStates v. Freeman,165 the Second Circuit overruled its prior
decisions which had adopted the M'Naghten rule for criminal responsibility. The court adopted the new American Law Institute insanity test.
The opinion was drafted by a three-judge panel and circulated to the full
court for approval. On the same day that Freeman was issued, the same
panel of the court issued United States v. Malafronte.166 In Malafronte,
the court applied the new, more liberal Freeman rule and reversed the
appellant's conviction. Because Malafronte applied the new Freeman
rule, it appeared that Freeman would have retroactive applicability.
Freeman would not simply apply to cases tried after that decision was
handed down, but would include cases previously tried that were still on
appeal when Freeman was decided. Some ten months later, another
Second Circuit panel clarified the retroactivity issue. In United States v.
Sheller,16 7 the court held that Freemanwould receive "limited" retroactive effect: it would apply to those cases still on direct appeal when it was
decided. 168 Two years after Sheller, the court again addressed the
question of retroactivity. In United States v. Tarrago,169 the court
convened in banc to consider whether Sheller was wrongly decided.17
The in banc court reaffirmed Sheller. Chief Judge Lumbard, in an opinion
in which Judge Moore concurred, however, pointed out the possibility
that a mistake was made when Freemanwas originally given retroactive
effect by Malafronte:
Since both Freeman and Malafronte were circulated to all of the
active judges of the court and neither my brethren nor I objected
or desired to give these cases en banc consideration, I feel

161 See id. at n.27 ("There is a danger ... that a court will not fully recognize the import
of what it is doing without going the advocacy route, and will change meaningful precedents
too casually.").
16 United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966).
166 United States v. Malafronte, 357 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1966).
167 United States v. Sheller, 369 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1966).
168 Id. at 295.
169 United States v. Tarrago, 398 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1968)(in banc).
171 Id. at 622 (noting that two members of initial three judge panel thought that Sheller
was wrongly decided).
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compelled to accept the logical consequences of the remand in
Malafronte ....
I am sure that had our attention been directed to the retroactivity issue in Freeman and Malafronte, or had the United States
Attorney sought en banc consideration of it, we might well have
decided the matter differently from its decision by a panel of the
7
court in Sheller.1 1
The response to this criticism requires both a closer look at the Freeman
series of cases and a more general response to the question whether
mistakes will often be made with the mini in banc procedure.
Despite the protests from Judges Lumbard and Moore, the procedural
history of the Freeman case does not clearly reveal an error. The error,
according to Judges Lumbard and Moore, was that the Malafronte court
was unaware that it was setting a precedent for retroactivity by applying
Freeman to the case, yet that was precisely the issue in Malafronte.The
court's retroactive application of Freeman should have been apparent to
the full court. More importantly, the Sheller court did not indicate that
Malafronte required that Freeman be given retroactive applicability in
all future cases. Instead, the Sheller court independently assessed the
claim that Freemanshould be made retroactive. 172 Thus even if the court
made a "mistake" in Freeman and Malafronte, it made the same "mistake" when directly confronted with the issue in Sheller and two years
later in Tarrago,1 73 In this posture, retroactive application of the Freeman rule does not appear to be the result of hasty decision-making.
Even assuming that Malafronte was wrongly decided, there is little
reason to believe that such mistakes would commonly occur. The
Malafronte case is the only mini in banc case where such an allegation
has been made." 74 The Malafronte retroactivity problem, moreover, is
unique to criminal law decisions that announce a new rule. Indeed, errors

172

Id. at 625-26.
Sheller, 369 F.2d at 295.

173

Tarrago, 398 F.2d at 623-25.

171

Indeed, the Tarragocourt makes a very persuasive case for the limited retroactivity of the

Freemanrule. The court pointed out, for example, that the question would really only affect
one or two cases that were on direct appeal when Freeman was decided. Id. at 623. The court
also cited several Supreme Court decisions in which new criminal law rules were given
limited retroactive effect. Id. (citing Linkletter v. Washington, 381 U.S. 618, 622 & nn. 4 &
5 (1965); Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 409 n.3 (1966)).
174 The Malafronte case demonstrates, moreover, that even if a mistake appears, it can be
corrected. After Malafronte was decided, the government could have requested rehearing
and rehearing in banc. The government apparently chose not to correct the "mistake."
Indeed, the government seems to have been unconcerned even when another criminal
defendant proposed to apply Freemanretroactively. See Sheller, 369 F.2d at 295 (referring
to government's pro forma claim that the expanded standard of Freeman should not apply
to Sheller.").
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are likely to occur more often in mini in banc cases only if the expedited
procedure encourages judges to overlook issues. Yet the very heart of a
mini in banc procedure is circulation to the full court to gain approval
over a particular aspect of a case. This procedure necessarily raises a red
flag over the controversial issue and renders very unlikely the possibility
of inadvertent decision-making.
D. Case or Controversy
The mini in banc procedure presents to the court the limited question
of whether a particular case should be overruled. That practice presents
the practical problem of deciding a case divorced from full briefs and oral
argument. Chief Judge Wald, dissenting in a recent D.C. Circuit case,
raised precisely this problem. 17 5 Chief Judge Wald suggested that this
problem is related to the "case or controversy" requirement of Article III,
which dictates that judges not issue advisory opinions on abstract legal
issues. 176 In her view, the central vice in such a practice is that an issue
may be decided without reference to its factual setting. When a court is
presented with only a limited issue, for example, it may fail to grasp the
opportunity to decide the case on the narrowest grounds. 17 7 Although
Chief Judge Wald raised this concern in a conventional in banc
proceeding, her criticism clearly applies to the mini in banc setting as
well. 178
Chief Judge Wald's criticism, however, misapprehends what is at
stake when the full court reviews a three-judge panel opinion via the
mini in banc procedure. The most useful analogy is to a request for
rehearing in banc. In such a case, the three-judge panel opinion has been
written. The losing party requests a rehearing and suggests rehearing in
banc. The full court reviews the request, including the allegations as to
errors made by the three-judge panel. If no judge calls for a vote on the
suggestion for rehearing in banc, the suggestion fails. If one judge calls

17'

See Church of Scientology v. IRS, 792 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir. 1986)(Wald, J., dissenting),

cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 947 (1987).
176 Id.
177 Id.
171 Judge Scalia writing for the majority in the Scientology case, specifically made this
connection:
[Judge Wald's] concern must logically extend, of course-and should indeed
have heightened application-to the court's common practice of rendering en banc
decisions on isolated legal issues without en banc rehearing, by means of a
so-called, "Irons footnote" added to the panel opinion, reflecting the fact that
departure from prior law of the circuit has been approved by the full court.
Scientology, 792 F.2d 153 at n.1. Judge Scalia went on to explain that it is apppropriate to
decide some legal issues without reference to their legal setting when the court is
functioning more as a law-giving body than as an error-correcting body. Id.
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regular active
for a vote, the vote is taken. A majority of the judges in179
service may then order that the case be reheard in banc.
With the suggestion for rehearing in banc, the whole case is before the
full court. Before the court reaches the merits of the case, however, it
must address a preliminary question, i.e., whether the full court should
take the case for in banc rehearing. In deciding that preliminary
question, the court may concentrate on a single issue to determine
whether it justifies rehearing in banc. This situation is essentially the
same as the Supreme Court's practice of taking a single issue for review
on writ of certiorari.
Chief Judge Wald's criticism is not, therefore, that the practice of
deciding some isolated legal issues is unprecedented. Rather, the Chief
Judge's Wald's complaint is that the judges of a court may not have access
to the entire factual record. This very narrow statement of the problem
suggests its own simple solution. When a three-judge panel suggests mini
in banc treatment to the full court, the full court should be made aware
of the factual setting of the case. This information could be conveyed in a
number of ways. The draft opinion should provide the essential factual
setting, and the briefs presented to the original three-judge panel will
also contain this information. The full court should be aware that these
briefs are available for review. Finally, the full court should be notified
that the record from the district court or agency is also available for
review.
E. Unfairness
At least one commentator, Professor Carrington, has suggested that
there is some unfairness in a court convening an in banc proceeding
without the prompting of counsel. According to Professor Carrington, it
may be unfair to subject a litigant to "unexpected and extraordinary
toils."1o Professor Carrington especially decried the informal convening
of the court via the mini in banc procedure.' 8
The unfairness objection to the mini in banc procedure loses most of its
potency once one recalls the purpose of in banc review. In banc review is
a tool provided to the courts for the resolution of conflicts in precedent
and important cases. Litigants may suggest the need for in banc review
but may not demand it. It is for the court to determine how it wishes to
exercise this power.'8 2 To the extent that the unfairness objection is based

FED. R. App. P. 35(a).
180 Carrington, supra note
179

44, at

583.

l~' Id.at 583 n. 183.
182

The Supreme Court, in the Western Pacific case, clearly suggested that in banc review

was a power granted to the court, not a right granted to litigants:
In our view, § 46(c) is not addressed to litigants. It is addressed to the Court of
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on the possibility that a court may operate in bane without the knowledge
of the parties, moreover, this objection is obviated by the existence of a set
of rules for mini in bane proceedings. When litigants realize that a court
can resolve conflicts via the mini in banc procedure, litigants are free to
suggest, where appropriate, that the procedure be used to resolve
troubling precedent.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The use of mini in bane procedures appears to be growing. Eight of the
twelve federal circuit courts of appeals have published opinions in which
some form of the procedure has been employed.183 The two circuits with
the longest history of use of the procedure, moreover, appear to have
184
stepped up their use of the procedure in recent years.
The increased use of mini in bane procedures is a natural response to
two trends creating pressures on the circuit courts of appeals. The first
trend is toward ever greater number of conflicts in precedent within and
between circuits. These conflicts ordinarily would require full in bane
treatment for resolution. The second trend is toward ever increasing

Appeals, It is a grant of power. It vests in the court the power to order hearings en
banc. It does no further. It neither forbids nor requires each active member of a
Court of Appeals to entertain each petition for a hearing or rehearing en banc.
The court is left free to devise its own administrative machinery to provide the
means whereby a majority may order such a hearing.
Western P. R.R. Corp. v. Western P. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 259, 261 (1953).
1"3 These circuits include: D.C., Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and
Federal.
'84 The Second Circuit, for example, has published 17 mini in banc decisions since 1966,
the bulk of which were published in the past ten years:
1
1974
0
1985
0
1984
0
1973
1983
4
1972
1
1971
0
1982
1
1
1
1970
1981
1969
0
1979
3
1968
0
1978
1
0
1967
0
1977
1966
2
1976
1
1
1975
The Seventh Circuit, which adopted its mini in banc rule in 1977, has also shown a steady
increase in the use of the procedure. The court has published 25 mini in bane cases since
1977:
1981
2
1986
3
4
1980
1
1985
2
1979
3
1984
0
1983
1
1978
1982
8
1977
1
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caseloads in the circuit courts of appeals. The increasing caseload
requires the circuit courts to carefully conserve their decision-making
resources. Mini in banc procedures, which can both resolve conflicts and
conserve judicial resources, have proven themselves an effective method
for dealing with these pressures.
No two circuits use precisely the same mini in banc procedures. By
studying the practices of other circuits, however, a court can effectively
refine its procedures, utilizing the better parts of the procedures adopted
by other courts. It is our hope that the description presented in this
Article will aid that process.
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